Timeline for Why aren't public-private keys sufficient to build a block chain? Why do we need proof of work/stake?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
14 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Apr 3, 2021 at 23:17 | comment | added | SpaceMonkey | Let us continue this discussion in chat. | |
| Apr 3, 2021 at 16:17 | comment | added | Pieter Wuille | In PoW, the most-work valid chains wins. But how this happens isn't relevant for your question: somehow one of the chains needs to win - or we'd end up with two separate currencies if they both survive, each with their own ecosystems around it. And yes, of course it is only honest nodes that can be assumed to follow the most-work chain, but they're also the only relevant ones - they're the ones miners hope to sell their earned BTC to! Note that nodes are not just miners. | |
| Apr 3, 2021 at 12:57 | vote | accept | SpaceMonkey | ||
| Apr 3, 2021 at 12:56 | comment | added | SpaceMonkey | @PieterWuille exactly, so how do the forks get resolved eventually? isn't it where the "honest" nodes accept only the longest chain? | |
| Apr 3, 2021 at 0:42 | comment | added | Pieter Wuille | They get a payout each in their own fork, but ultimately forks get resolved - and only one one chain will eventually be accepted by the network. The subsidies/fees received in the extinguished chain don't result in money that's acceptable as BTC. | |
| Apr 2, 2021 at 23:48 | comment | added | SpaceMonkey | but they are receiving their mining fees as long as they continue on their version of the chain. What makes them ditch their version and switch to the other chain? | |
| Apr 2, 2021 at 23:44 | comment | added | Pieter Wuille | Only the subsidy/fee income miners receiving in the winning chain matters. If miners build competing chains, only one of those will win. | |
| Apr 2, 2021 at 23:43 | comment | added | SpaceMonkey | @PieterWuille what is the incentive for miners to cooperate on a single chain? if miners receive transactions in different orders and create a split chain, what is the incentive for one group of miners to discard their version of the chain and adopt the other one? | |
| Apr 2, 2021 at 23:24 | history | edited | chytrik | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Apr 2, 2021 at 23:13 | comment | added | Pieter Wuille | Proof of work is not eventually consistent, at least if you mean the technical term from distributed systems - that would imply that after a finite amount of time a certain state is irreversibly agreed upon by all participants. Under PoW, there is always a chance of reorganization, regardless of how deep it is buried. What PoW adds is an incentive for miners to cooperate on a single chain rather than work against each other, and under certain economic assumptions, that means the chance of reorgs goes down exponentially as time passes - but it still never becomes zero. | |
| Apr 2, 2021 at 23:09 | comment | added | chytrik | @SpaceMonkey I added a bit more to my answer. Chain splits can indeed happen, proof of work helps to guarantee an eventual consensus. The few blocks at the chain tip would not be considered as secure as much older blocks in the same chain. | |
| Apr 2, 2021 at 23:07 | history | edited | chytrik | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Apr 2, 2021 at 23:06 | comment | added | SpaceMonkey | just to add to your answer, split chain can still happen in PoW by honest miners and we fix this by taking the longer chain. So it seems like the main benefit of PoW is to solve transaction order problem (called "double spending"), is there any other benefit? | |
| Apr 2, 2021 at 23:01 | history | answered | chytrik | CC BY-SA 4.0 |