Timeline for If anyone with your seed phrase can generate your wallet private keys, what is the advantage of a hardware wallet?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
5 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Aug 1, 2018 at 13:59 | comment | added | Raghav Sood | In reality, there is no perfect solution. It's just that, currently, hardware wallets tend to have the fewest attack vectors, especially if you add a passphrase so your seed that you have memorised. Then, even with the seed, your wallet is inaccessible unless you give up the passphrase, which is also entered on device, and cannot be logged. | |
| Aug 1, 2018 at 13:57 | vote | accept | Gehrard Raven | ||
| Aug 1, 2018 at 13:51 | comment | added | Raghav Sood | But it increases the opportunities for a others. If I know you do that, all I need is a usb keylogger between your keyboard and your computer, and patience. The more often you type the seed, the more chances I have. | |
| Aug 1, 2018 at 13:50 | comment | added | Gehrard Raven | The idea would be to not keep any data in any wallet, just keep the seed phrase on a physical medium well hidden. That would reduce the time window for the attacks you mentioned to: - the moment the seed is generated until it is copied into the medium and deleted. - any time I use the seed to regenerate keys to access the funds and then delete all data again. Your point about the seed being generated in a safer environment is valid, though. As the fact that in normal cases using the hardware wallet instead of regenerating the keys every time I want to access the funds would be much safer. | |
| Aug 1, 2018 at 13:34 | history | answered | Raghav Sood | CC BY-SA 4.0 |