I have been reading at few places that miners will enforce new consensus rules. Examples:
04:20 < AaronvanW> aj: I think "my" type of futures market could be combined with "your" type of futures market? My futures market would inform miners if the market wants them to activate or not, your futures market would inform them (post-activation) if they should enforce or not. I think the second futures market (enforce or not) would be kinda pointless in this context, since the market already told miners to activate (among other reasons), but hey if people want to bet on that they can. (And I think this should address Matt's point/concern.)
04:32 < AaronvanW> the second futures market would have an asymmetric advantage in favor of enforcing, but I'd say that's a good thing. (again, I think this futures market would be kinda pointless... just addressing concerns here.)
According to my understanding:
Devs code implementation for a BIP, followed by reviews and discussions
MASF: Miners are asked to signal readiness, new consensus rules are activated if most miners are ready in time. Blocks that do not follow new consensus rules after activation are rejected by full nodes.
UASF: Miners are informed about a deadline, new consensus rules are activated irrespective of miners readiness if enough miners fail to signal before deadline. Blocks that don't follow new consensus rules after activation are rejected by full nodes. (In BIP 148 blocks are rejected that do not signal and BIP 8 has a MUST_SIGNAL phase and lockinontimeout)
In both cases, rules are 'enforced' by full nodes.
Are miners "following" the new consensus rules after activation that they agreed to activate and signaled readiness or miners are "enforcing" new consensus rules? If they are enforcing new consensus rules, what is the role of full nodes? And if miners enforce new consensus rules can we consider miners signaling as voting?