Lightning network nodes can be brought online permissionlessly. Most Lightning nodes do not have identity information attached. The Lightning Network topology is multi-dimensional, since it is a scale-free network in which every participant can create a connection to any other participant. If "a region" of the Lightning Network gets split off, the affected nodes are free to create new channels with other nodes, easily healing such imposed segregation.
Onion routing means that each forwarding hop is embedded in its own encrypted package. Each forwarder only gets to peel a single layer of the onion. You cannot see where a multi-hop payment you are routing is ultimately headed. You can only see the next hop and learn which node forwarded the payment to you. The actual destination node can even be hidden from the sender by using routing hints.
So, to even find out which nodes are operated by a persona non grata and then whether a payment is intended for them would likely require the vast majority of nodes to comply with some KYC or surveillance procedures. Especially given the Lightning Network's international user base, it's not obvious to me that compliance of this invasiveness can actually be enforced on private users, let alone on nodes operated e.g. via the Tor network.
While "major hubs" and custodial services can choose not to send directly to nodes classified as part of a "restricted region", it would be almost impossible for them to know when they are forwarding a payment that is routed there. If they generally refrain from forwarding and only send and receive, that would prevent them from becoming "major hubs" in the first place, though. Thus, it seems that such regulation would directly impose economic disadvantages on the compliant nodes, giving an edge to alternative "hubs" operated privately or abroad.