Using the terminology from: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Protocol_specification#tx
What prevents an attacker operating a rogue client from replacing the tx_out of a transaction with values that assign the output of the transaction to the attacker?
The tx_in is unchanged (and presumably valid), but the outputs now benefit the attacker.
A new hash can then be calculated and announced by the rogue client using the inv message.
If nothing prevents this occurring, how does the Bitcoin network prevent this rogue transaction from being included in a block?
[Not having anyway to comment at this point]
Thanks David, that clarified greatly my [mis]understanding of the documentation at:
The OP_CHECKSIG description says in part:
The entire transaction's outputs, inputs, and script (from the most recently-executed OP_CODESEPARATOR to the end) are hashed.
I'd thought "the entire transaction" was the preceding transaction, not the redeeming transaction, that was signed as you describe.
Thank you again for helping me out.