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For example, on macOS:

brew install --cask bitcoin-core

Or on Ubuntu:

snap install bitcoin-core

Etc.

In particular, what attack vectors might I be exposing myself to if I choose to install Bitcoin Core using a package manager?

Using Homebrew as an example:

  1. I presume that download hashes are checked in Homebrew?
  2. Are hash signatures checked?
  3. Does Homebrew have a mechanism that ensures that only a Bitcoin Core maintainer can update a package on Homebrew?
  4. Could I still be vulnerable to a malicious/compromised Homebrew maintainer who changes the download URL and hash?
  5. Are there any other similar issues or risks?

(N.B.: If the only "safe" method is to build from source or to download Bitcoin Core directly, it's fine to note this and why, but I ask that you please keep answers focused on any risks associated with using a package manager instead.)

Thanks!

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    Homebrew checks download hashes to ensure the integrity of downloaded files. It does not natively support cryptographic signature verification for packages. There is a potential risk of a malicious or compromised Homebrew maintainer changing the download URL and hash for a package.
    – Mani T
    Commented Sep 8, 2023 at 3:29
  • Thank you, @ManiT! It sounds like a more niche package manager is needed (and may eventually develop) that maintains an appropriate chain of verifiable trust for higher risk packages like various Bitcoin and LN implementations, etc, though I am likely underappreciating the complexities in this idea. Commented Sep 8, 2023 at 17:43

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