The protocol presented in  is vulnerable to the so-called mauling problem, where an adversary which knows the hash identifier T of a transaction is able to come up with a hash identifier T 0 that is semantically equivalent to T (i.e. spends the same transaction, has the same value, and the same inputs and outputs). As the authors of  point out, there are many Bitcoin software clients that cannot handle transactions appearing in the ledger with an hash identifier which is different from the original one (namely, the one with which they were posted) . This effectively makes the transaction unredeemable, causing problems when creating Bitcoin contracts [2,3]. While the authors acknowledge the mauling problem, their scheme only addresses mauling due to malleability in ECDSA signatures, but does not address mauling due to changing the script.
The reference  cited is Efficient Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payments in Cryptocurrencies Without Scripts
This sounds a lot like transaction malleability. What is the difference?
If it is not the same, is mauling fixed by Segregated Witness?