As Andrew's answer on that question points out, paying to a hashed address does not 'quantum-proof' your coins, however there is a mention of using a zero-knowledge proof of a BIP32 seed to recover coins safely, against the threat of a quantum computer capable of breaking the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP).
If this is possible, then clearly there are advantages to more complex constructions for addresses (the BIP32 key-derivation function being apparently more quantum-proof, in this case).
So my question is: what address constructions are known to provide some level of safety from a quantum computer defeating the ECDLP? How is this safety provided? How can a user create addresses today, to allow themselves the best chance of having their Bitcoin-wealth survive a highly capable quantum computer?
Note that this question is meant to explore what a user can do now to mitigate the risk of the 'worst-case-scenario' of ECDLP being broken suddenly and unexpectedly soon; with time to plan there are obviously less scary ways to switch to a quantum-secure algorithm.
EDIT: for the sake of this question, lets assume that users have unanimously agreed to fork the chain from a certain block that was mined before the quantum-computer attack began, and the fork will lock all coins that are easily stolen by the QC (P2PK outputs, reused addresses, etc). Consider the case in which every bitcoin is stored at an address which will allow safe recovery, suddenly the potential damage to the network is lessened greatly. Even if this is unlikely, I think it is academically interesting.