If I start
bitcoind with settings
proxy=127.0.0.1:9050 to talk to the Tor daemon's SOCKS5 proxy, turn on
listenonion=1 and set
onlynet=onion, my understanding is that
bitcoind will coordinate with the Tor daemon to find a randomized onion public key/identifier and begin operating with other .onion peers.
However, what is stopping a Tor-connected onion node from behaving badly in a way that would 'normally' get the IPV4/V6 address banned had it been doing the same thing via that connection type?
It seems to me like a malicious node could just re-randomize the credentials on Tor to evade any ban. Does this mean that Tor nodes are less robust than the IPV4/V6 and more susceptible to DDoS and other attacks? or has this been accounted for somehow?
An explanation would be helpful. Thank you!