Search Results

I'm not 100% sure I've understood your suggestion, in part because you've used some non-standard terminology. But it looks like this is actually two suggestions rolled into one. The first is a mechani …

If a normal tx is honest, has 6 confirmations, and there happens to be a reorg 6 blocks deep, the tx will just go back to the floating pool, and join one of the next blocks, with no harm done to any party … If a coinbase tx has only 6 confirmations and there is a reorg, the original coins vanish from existence, invalidating the transaction, and any subsequent transactions that depend on it. …

And the number of confirmations required to prevent double-spending by an agent with a given hashrate will also not change (6 is an arbitrary number reflecting a "low enough" probability for someone with …

The protocol and the standard client allow you to spend your own unconfirmed change. Multibit didn't allow this, but I believe it's a recently/soon added feature. When constructing your transaction m …

This is a solved problem, see https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=25786.0 and this. It has also been recently implemented in BitcoinJ, and called "Micropayment channels".

Also, the idea of "wait for 6 confirmations or 1 hour" in Bitcoin is a myth. … If 1 hour passes with 3 confirmations you're less secure than if 30 minutes passed with 3 confirmations, because the attacker would have had more time to build his competing branch. …

There is no hard and fast rule. It depends on who is trying to attack and how. But I'd say that for amounts of up to $30, 0-confirmation transactions are usually very safe. For larger amounts it depen …

Yes, 6 confirmations that due to luck took, say, 30 minutes, are even safer than 6 confirmations that took 60 minutes, since the attacker would have had less time to find blocks in his alternative branch …

The figure of 6 blocks is completely arbitrary. It is based on the assumptions that the attacker will not amass more than 10% of the network hashrate, and that a negligible chance of 0.1% for successf …

The number of confirmations is (height of most recent block - height of the block containing the transaction + 1). … The contents of the specific block containing the transaction are fixed, while the number of confirmations keeps increasing, so the number of confirmations cannot be in the raw block data. …

The answer is yes - a Finney attack can only be made by a miner, or by someone partnering with a miner. What you're missing is that a Finney attack is a specific kind of attack. It is not interchangea …