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What does the UASF proposal entail? The UASF proposal is an extension of BIP9 that allows soft-forks to specify a mandatory activation time. If miners have not started signaling support by this time, they must start to signal. Any blocks not signaling support for the soft-fork after this time are rejected. BIP148 is an instance of the UASF proposal that ...


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Should block height or MTP (median time past [...]) or a mixture of both be used in an activation mechanism like BIP 8 or BIP 9 for defining the timings of the state transitions? What are the advantages and disadvantages of both and how do they compare? The main advantage of MTP is that it usually roughly corresponds to wall time, so it's easy to ...


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Most past soft forks have been deployed with miner activated soft forks, and we know this because the deployment mechanisms used only allowed for miner activated soft forks. For a user activated soft fork to happen, the deployment mechanism would have to have some form of activation that is not reliant on miners. Thus far, the activation methods used have ...


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See my answer here to address some of your misconceptions. TL;DR: miners signal support in blocks for certain rule changes in order to coordinate activation, not to determine whether it is accepted or not. As for the actual mechanism used to signal, a number have been used in the past: Time based: BIP16, BIP30 Early softforks (up to mid 2012) used a simple ...


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No. BIP 148 is a soft fork as the BIP 148 chain is valid to all non-BIP148 nodes and can wipe out the non-BIP 148 chain if it were to be longer than it. Because it is a soft fork, there cannot be any replay protection otherwise it would become a hard fork.


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First of all, let me clarify that this website just collects the sentiment of miners—it is in no way binding for the actual activation for which code isn't even proposed. Assuming that Taproot will use BIP8 as its activation mechanism, there is only one state in which miners are required to signal. Mining is mandatory in the last difficulty epoch of the ...


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BIP 149 is different in that it does not enforce orphaning of blocks that don't signal readiness for SegWit. Instead just the supporters enforce the rules on any blocks that contain SegWit data and allow regular blocks to be mixed into the chain. Thus, miners that don't change anything will build on the SegWit chain. To split the network, miners would need ...


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There are two related risks: Activating without a majority of hashpower supporting it over the long term. Let's use BIP 66 as an example. Imagine it had activated at the 95% threshold, but 30 minutes later, more than half of the miners reverted to the old implementation that doesn't support BIP66. What you now have is a situation where nodes that enforce ...


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The two thresholds enable two different rules. If more than 750 of the last 1000 blocks are version 2, the network starts enforcing BIP34 - at this point, blocks that claim to be version 2 but do not comply with the requirements outlined in BIP34 are rejected. Version 1 blocks continue to be accepted. Once more than 950 of the last 1000 blocks are valid ...


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No measurement is going to give you the full picture due to sybil attacks, incomplete datasets, data source abstraction/summarization, etc. However, there are resources out there that are trying to make it easier to see through the fog: Nodes: https://coin.dance/nodes Blocks (miners): https://coin.dance/blocks Poli (companies): https://coin.dance/poli


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The total node count is not relevant. It's easy to spin up nodes, or even fake nodes that just report a certain user agent string. That doesn't mean that they care about the rules, plan to keep following them if the hashrate majority goes another way, whether they'd even notice if they're forked off, or even whether they actually implement the rules. What ...


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Using block heights for the start and timeout parameters has the advantage of giving miners a known number of signaling periods. Loss of hashpower doesn't reduce the number of retarget periods available for activation. Especially for an activation mechanism over a shorter time horizon (e.g. the Speedy Trial proposal) it may be important to ensure miners ...


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nickler answered this on IRC. In a mixed network, the rules can become active, but in two separate chains because lot=true nodes will reject blocks from the lot=false chain which doesn't require 100% signaling. The MUST_SIGNAL phase (when lot=true) overlaps with the last two weeks (2016 blocks) of the STARTED phase (when lot=false). In the case that the ...


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If I just leave them as is, what happens? Nothing, if a fork occurs, you get coins on the two sides of it. If I switch my Trezor to UASF, what happens? If you do not spend your coins after a fork happens, nothing happens. If you spend coins after the fork, you might expose yourself to replay attacks even though you are transacting on the UASF chain. ...


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Although the devil is of course in the details, how could such an upgrade process look like? and What are the different upgrade mechanism for the major [v1 - v16] and minor [v1.0 - v1.127] version changes? As Pieter Wuille mentioned in the comments, "There isn't even a proposal. Discussion about activation and all its implications is something to be ...


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Such a system could be easily gamed by people who simply spam the network with transactions and by miners who choose what transactions to include in their blocks. The penalty which they incur is still very small as compared to income of major economic players. It does not take into account the amount of coins and also does not consider the vote of people ...


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I would refine (in square brackets) StephenM's answer above as follows: "For [UASF] upgraded nodes, the longer the stand-off continues, the more transactions build up in the backlog without miners mining them. For miners, a chain-split means they are creating bitcoins that exchanges and users [ON THE UPGRADED NODES ONLY] will not accept as payment, which ...


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