14

It's certainly possible. The card would basically need four functions: add/generate account, add bitcoins, prove bitcoins, spend bitcoins. The card could piggyback on external smart systems so the card doesn't need to do very much. Each function would be implemented as follows: Add Account: An ECDSA private key would either be randomly generated by the ...


13

If you update the firmware you are probably safe, but why take the chance? The Trezor itself (or even the included USB cable https://www.wired.com/2014/07/usb-security/) could have been corrupted/replaced by a sophisticated actor. If someone gave me a used Trezor for free, I would throw it in the garbage. No discount would be sufficient enough for me to ...


9

The primary concern with Bitcoin security is where your private keys are stored. In your scenario the private keys are stored on a Linux laptop which is not unreasonable if you follow good internet hygiene and security practices. The next best approach is to purchase a hardware wallet from the likes of Trezor or Ledger. These wallets have High Security ...


8

GPG Keys "TREZOR can now securely generate GPG keys for signing of emails or documents (using the NIST256P1 and Ed25519 curves). Currently, this update does not allow for GPG decryption, a feature planned for next firmware update. For more information check out the great TREZOR Agent by Roman Zeyde." https://medium.com/@satoshilabs/trezor-firmware-1-3-6-...


8

If your machine connects to the internet at all, it should be considered potentially compromised. Consider what happens to it if you visit GMail, which happens to deliver an ad with compromised JavaScript, for instance. Secure storage of a bitcoin wallet can only be really considered "mostly secure" if the machine is never connected to any network, and ...


7

This data on Ledger production costs seems relevant: https://forum.daohub.org/t/ledger-proposal-for-the-dao-1-ethereum-hardware-wallet/1750 Significant price savings exist with orders as small as 6,000 units Q: "Why 6,000 units?" A: "This is our estimate of the best compromise of minimum order needed to get good prices, without having too much stock on ...


6

Trezor implements BIP32/BIP39 (hierarchical deterministic wallet and mnemonic encoded seeds, respectively). The mnemonic (12 words) is just a way of encoding a hex seed like 6c5f9d00018f2a2030afcc6f3057e5a4dea6dfb905dd4b0197a9a047bcfe0501662332a3caa846b1223ff3d20cfb295e7f94fe51c94472e3f8429c97754132e9 (whose mnemonic would be business weird season glimpse ...


6

If I remember correctly, the Trezor uses deterministic wallets, as specified in BIP 0032. That means that the device will give you a sentence that the wallet can be regenerated from, in case it's lost.


5

(trezor-agent developer here...) Please take a look at the latest trezor-agent version here. I'd be happy to fix any issue with the documentation, and extend it with more examples to make it more helpful for first-time users :) EDIT: Make sure to install all the required packages as described here: https://github.com/romanz/trezor-agent/blob/master/INSTALL....


4

Found this just after asking the question. https://blog.ledger.co/how-to-protect-hardware-wallets-against-tampering-cad35cb72c1


4

BIP 32/39 allows key portability across different wallet implementations. To complement the "Wizard of Ozzie" answer above, a different method (C++ based, not JavaScript based code) is provided below to reconstruct the results above using the bitcoin-explorer (bx) command line interface that should be executed offline with "real" mnemonics and keys. ...


4

Nobody else has made much of a mention of physical security, yet. You may also like to consider the possibility of: Fire; do you have another copy of your private keys if your building burns down? Of course, storing additional copies adds additional risk of compromise. Natural disasters; depending on location, you may also need to consider the possibility ...


3

The researcher Jochen Hoenicke has done some work on the Trezor. He was able to extract the private key by monitoring the power cable with an oscilloscope. Trezor has since updated the firmware to defeat the described attack.


3

Personal, I would use multiple wallets just in case some exploit is found in the future. For the more paranoid/safety conscious person, I would also place the hardware wallet in a mini faraday cage, until needed. The reason behind the faraday cage is that electromagnetic radiation of WIRED or even hardwired devices can be picked up from up to 65 feet away; ...


3

As explained in their FAQ, Trezor works together with existing wallet software, it's not a standalone wallet. What happens is that the wallet you use gets the addresses from your wallet from Trezor and can display your balance with that information. When you want to spend money, it will create a transaction as it would normally do, but instead of signing ...


3

The benefit of hardware deterministic wallets is that your keys are permanently kept offline and secret, as long as you don't leak your seed words. To spend bitcoin, the transaction signing is performed on the device, keeping your keys safe. If you encrypt the keys yourself (I'm assuming you're talking about bitcoin private keys, not an HD wallet seed), it ...


3

For Trezor specifically, just check their website for details. Essentially, you need to have: a new or wiped Trezor wallet. your Trezor recovery card, filled out correctly. a computer with the Trezor bridge software installed. You plug the new Trezor into the computer, open the Bridge software, and and follow the "Trezor Recovery" instructions. It will ...


3

If you do this correctly, it would mirror your wallet, yes. BUT! Doing so is probably not a good idea, because you'll have to type your seed phrase into a desktop computer that may be compromised. The point of a hardware wallet is keeping your keys locked away in a device which never touches the internet, testing your backup seed phrase on an internet-...


3

Create a seed outside a hardware wallet and then importing it in this latter doesn't make any sense. Hardware wallets have a strong security because the seed is generated by themselves and never revealed outside. I would recommend to wait for your hardware wallet and then generate and transfer your coins on it. If you know the risk and still want to ...


3

Yes, a hardware wallet could be designed for use on the Lighting Network, but no, there's no such thing as eliminating risk of theft. There is always risk of theft, no matter what you do. A hardware wallet could be made to sign the transactions needed to construct the smart contracts for lightning channels, and could even be made to communicate with them. ...


3

Ledger uses a secure element chip to store the private key. In simplified terms this means that the private key is stored on a special chip that is almost like a small computer with a Operating System with a very strict and well defined interface. This interface is designed to NEVER allow an extraction of the private key except during the creation of the ...


3

If LBC is somehow able to guess anyone's private key, regardless of how the private key is normally stored and generated, then yes, they can just spend the coins. All you need is the private key, it does not matter how the key was obtained. Of course this is impossible to do in practice with today's technology. The range of possible private keys is ...


3

Well, in both cases, your seed words are ultimately the key to the wallet. If you use a regular wallet, you open yourself up to a number of other attacks Malware on the device that runs the software wallet Keyloggers People shoulder surfing Backdoored wallet software Moreover, larger OSes like Windows, Linux, and Mac OS have considerably larger attack ...


3

That is correct, a hardware wallet does not have access to any information from the blockchain except that provided by the host computer. So it does not know anything about the amounts unless the host provides it to them. Because of this, hardware wallets have some extra requirements for signing. Many devices, for non-segwit inputs, require the entire ...


2

I don't see why not. Most of what you need to do is just modular arithmetic with big integers (around 2^256). There's no obstruction to doing this on an 8-bit microprocessor, it just takes a few more instructions. You might even find some existing code for arbitrary-precision arithmetic. 256 bits is 32 bytes, so 8K of memory seems like plenty.


2

I have a HW.1 too. I purchased mine, so it came with the recovery card. If you have your recovery card, you might be able to contact their support and ask how you could convert your security card's details into the 16 byte key If you can't do this, then use the link you posted previously to generate a random key, and then generate your card. Remember to ...


2

You would want to use a mixing service. Essentially, you would send your 10 coins from your old wallet to the mixing service and get the same amount out to the new wallet. This effectively anonymizes your coins if the mixing service is doing its job correctly. A similar effect can be done by sending your coins to an exchange from your old wallet and taking ...


2

Both Trezor and Ledger support BIP 39 so yes they should be compatible. Having the same keys on both just increases the risk because only one needs to be compromised to steal the coins, but it's not a big risk imo.


2

When using a hardware wallet, the gui wallet on the computer or phone creates the transactions, but does not sign it. The transaction details get sent to the hardware wallet and it signs it and sends it back? Is this correct? Yes. Does the hardware wallet ever pass the private key data back to the computer to sign? No. The private keys never leave the ...


2

Generating keys on a computer that has never (and will never) connect to the internet is much more secure than generating keys on a computer that has (or will) connect to the internet. Hardware wallets do not connect to the internet, ever. They interface with a computer, but through extremely restricted channels that ensure the part of the device that ...


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