Is this considered safe enough?
Nothing is "safe enough" if we do not know the cost.
OK, if you have $100k in bitcoins the 12-words phrase is safe enough.
If the 12-words phrase is the seed to the "Method of destroying the Universe" I would recommend to add at least 11 bits of entropy and use 13 words.
I don't know if this is the recommended way, but I did this by using the Send Nxt API call on an offline computer, storing the transaction bytes, and broadcasting the transaction from an online computer by using the Broadcast Transaction API call.
You can dump your old wallet to a backup file, restart the program to generate a new wallet and import your old wallet into it.
Assuming you are in the directory where your wallet file is located, using the command line that would look like this:
bitcoind walletpassphrase "xxx" 60
bitcoind dumpwallet "wallet.dat.backup"
mv wallet.dat wallet....
The chances of someone "brute-forcing" or guessing your seed is extremely slim. There are more than 5 duodecillion possible combinations of twelve-word seeds. Just so you get an idea of how big that number is, it's more than 1 thousand million million million million million million possibilities.
The wallet actually uses a randomly generated master key to encrypt the keys, and this master key is encrypted using your passphrase.
When you change the passphrase, all that changes is the encrypted master key. The actually encrypted wallet keys aren't touched at all.
A very, very long time.
Oxford English Dictionary contains full entries for 171,476 words in current use.
If you use only lower case letters and they are mostly random words (no phrases - "four score and seven years ago" is like having your password be "secret"), there are about 7.47e41 possibilities.
At 50 million attempts per second, it'll be about 4....
The passphrase is stored as part of the wallet.dat file, so yes, that should work, as long as you haven't received any payments to addresses with private keys that don't exist in the old wallet.
Note that these received payments can actually occur when you send a payment, as a hidden "change" amount is sent to an unused hidden private key which is stored ...
If your passphrase contains spaces or special characters, you will need to wrap it with single quotes (') so that the debug console can properly parse your passphrase. For example, if your passphrase were This is my passphrase, then your command should be
walletpassphrase 'This is my passphrase'
Is there a way to just manually transfer the btc from the old wallet into a new wallet we do have access to
You need at least one of the things you have none of
PIN or password for the wallet.
Recovery phrase for the wallet.
is there any way to extract the password or private keys directly from the wallet file?
The brute-force ...
What can I do?
You could find tools that automate the trying of various combinations of seed-words. Some are mentioned in similar questions here. For example btctools, btcrecover. Use them or adapt them to your needs.
Lost my Bitcoin wallet and have only 11 out of 12 mnemonic seed phrase words. How can I get my Bitcoins?
Need help to recover blpckchain....
In particular, is there a way to make it so that it is impossible to know if a transaction signed with a password is correct unless its part of a mined block? This way, even if your password only requires 1,000,000 tries to crack, the attacker needs to mine 1,000,000 blocks to bruteforce the password?
I'm not aware of any cryptographic constructions that ...
Multibit will prompt you for a password regardless of whether you are sending it to your own wallet or not. This is by design, since if it didn't do this, it would allow anyone who can access your laptop to transfer bitcoins from your encrypted wallet by sending it to the unencrypted wallet first.
Sorry but unless you made an unencrypted backup of the ...
If your wallet hasn't been compromised (how can you be sure?) then it should be enough to secure it with a strong passphrase and then be sure to back it up.
If your wallet has been or even just might have been compromised then securing it with a strong passphrase now might not be enough. Sending the Bitcoins at risk to a new address in the same wallet ...
No. The whole point of strong encryption is that it is impossible to recover the data without the passphrase.
Keep trying to brute force (maybe with faster computers, or a better initial guess at the passphrase)
See if you have a backup of the wallet.dat file that isn't encrypted
Try really hard to remember
Give up, and resolve to be more careful ...
Blockchain.info does not use 2FA for encrypting the wallet and instead uses it only for limiting access via the web interface. If your system is compromised with a keylogger, and the attacker has access to the blockchain.info wallet (e.g., the backups sent via e-mail), for instance, then the attacker can perform a replay attack and spend the funds from the ...
No, because the encrypted keys don't change in that case.
When you encrypt a wallet.dat file, a random master key is generated, the master key is encrypted using your passphrase, and the actual address keys are encrypted using the master key.
When you change the passphrase, only the encrypted master key is changed.
Yes, any person you give your rpcpass and rpcuser to can control your wallet, that's not what the wallet encryption password designed to protect against. You really don't want to be giving arbitrary users your RPC authentication details under any circumstance, and I can't think of one where you would need to.
No, bitcoin core does not expand environment variables in bitcoin.conf.
See here to see how options are parsed.
You can expand environment variables as arguments for bitcoind:
$ bitcoind -rpcuser="$RPC_USERNAME" -rpcpassword="$RPC_PASSWORD"
However, have never had the option of providing a passphrase.
You must certainly have set a passphrase in the past. There's no way to remove it without knowing exactly what it is. If you can not recall what password you set, your funds are lost.
The wallet passphrase is there to protect the wallet file on disk. It is not an authentication mechanism or a security measure against anyone who can see what is sent to it. It does however prevent private keys from hitting disk in readable form.
That is certainly weird and it's most likely that you simply are typing a different password. To test this hypothesis, install MultiBit on another computer and import your wallet to see if it works. Perhaps your local MultiBit instance is corrupted.
Another option would be to try different versions of the client, although the wallet encryption algorithm ...
Might want to experiment with libbitcoin's command line interface called bitcoin explorer (bx). Instructions for using v3.0 bx commands used below are found here in the right pane.
Assuming there is no mnemonic password, and the associated public key is compressed, the associated BIP 32/39/44 m/44'/0'/0'/0/0 private key and address can be computed as ...
So just like Nick said, If the encryption is done using 256 bits then creating a passphrase which is 512 bits long would be the same as creating a passphrase which is 256 bits long (as long as its random).
You should look into brainwallets as they provide a way to create strong passwords which are also easily memorable since all you have to memorize is a 3 ...
There is a copy of the password stored encrypted with an AES key derived from the wallet words.
Thus if you forget your password and still have a copy of your wallet you can use your wallet words to recover your password.
In short: 12-word seed has enough entropy to be safe against brute force attack.
First of all not all 132 bits are random. Seed uses some kind of control sum.
Lets talk about 128 bits of entropy.
Lets imaging the following attack:
We will take one billion (10^9) of the most powerful mining hardware in 2017 (13 TH/s each).
We will make a 1000 years brute ...
how in the heck am I supposed to retrieve my first purchase ever from this paper wallet if the passcode I believe I used, is not working?
Sadly, if you created a BIP38 paper wallet and lost the password, then your bitcoins are locked away forever. A password protected wallet would be kinda useless if there was a way to circumvent the password protection. ...
(Some wallets that generate word lists for recovery also allow a user-created passphrase, so I'm using "recovery seed" to denote the word list.)
I'm not familiar with Mycelium specifically, but many wallets use a standard known as BIP39 to generate recovery seeds. That technique draws the words randomly from a list of 2048 words, with duplicates allowed. ...
Current blockchain.info wallets use the BIP39 wordlist, which you can find for various languages at https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039/bip-0039-wordlists.md/
Previous versions have used non-standard implementations with a variety of different wordlists for example v2 and v3.
Bitcoin Core is not affiliated with the website you downloaded the node installer from - bitsblock.io, and the official Bitcoin Core client does not provide functionality you ask about. I noticed that when you click on download button on this website it takes you to some restore form. This seems very sketchy - I'd never provide online my private key nor any ...