There is a lot of concern about waiting for confirmations to avoid a double spend attack, but has there ever actually been a double spend attack?

It seems to be that there are two types of double spend attack. One is perpetrated without a significant fraction of the network's total mining power. In order to successfully perpetrate this the attacker must send both transactions nearly simultaneously. If there is a significant delay between the legitimate transaction and the double spend then almost every miner will receive the legitimate transaction before the double spend. The miners will reject the double spend, and the legitimate transaction will be almost guaranteed to be included in the next block. Thus to successfully perpetrate this kind of double spend, the attacker must send out both transactions simultaneously so that half the network is working on one and half the network is working on the other. However if they do this, then it should be easy for the payee to immediately detect and thus the payee can reject the payment within seconds. Thus a double spend attack without a substantial fraction of the network power would not seem to be a problem--it is easily and immediately detected (or it will fail).

Thus, the only kind of double spend that is likely to succeed is one where the attacker controls a substantial fraction of the network power and can catch up from an initial handicap in block creation. However, until such a double spend has been demonstrated it implies that no malicious entity has achieved control over a substantial fraction of the networks computing power.

Thus, if a double spend attack has never been perpetrated, everyday users transferring small amounts of bitcoins can be very confident that they will not be victims of a double spend attack (what are the chances of being the first?) and forgo waiting for confirmations.

(People conducting very large anonymous transactions on the other hand may be among the first people targeted by an double spender who has achieved a substantial fraction of network computing power)

Is that analysis correct?

  • Not necessarily a "possible duplicate" since it doesn't address the specific question of whether an attack has ever been perpetrated, but quite similar to a question I asked a while back Commented Sep 7, 2011 at 21:57

5 Answers 5


For what it's worth, MyBitcoin.com claimed that their closure was precipitated by a series of double-spend attacks:

Our programmer was under the assumption that one block was good enough to secure a transaction. Two years ago when the software was written, this single confirm myth was a popular belief.

User theymos (an administrator of the bitcointalk.org forums) had publicly warned them that accepting transactions after a single confirmation was "insane."

However, there is no way to verify whether or not any double-spend attacks have actually taken place because to my knowledge no one is currently scanning for them on the network (doublespent transactions are normally discarded after the event is resolved to the satisfaction of the block-chain). All we can observe publicly are block-chain reorganisations which also naturally occur from time to time when blocks are found near-simultaneously by different miners or pools. Perhaps a statistical argument could estimate how often these should be occurring (we've had 14 in the past month) and argue for the existence of double-spend attempts on that basis, but I've not personally seen such an analysis.

Most critically to your question about whether or not to wait for confirmation, however, is the fact that you have missed a possible attack vector, known as a "Finney Attack" after Hal Finney who identified it. In a Finney Attack, a miner includes one "double" of the two transactions in their own blocks while mining, but does not broadcast it to the network. When they eventually find a block, they purchase something with a conflicting transaction (the second "double" in the double-spend attack), and then immediately broadcast their block, which will invalidate the purchasing transaction in the blockchain. If the merchant hasn't waited for confirmation, the attacker would walk away with both the purchased item (hopefully something cashlike) and their original bitcoins.

Since this situation and its variants apply largely to merchants who offer 'on-demand' items delivered instantly, your analysis of "everyday users transferring small amounts of bitcoins" remains roughly correct. Keep in mind that if accepting 0-confirmation transactions became the norm, the incentive for the "send them simultaneously" attack would rise significantly (requiring even one confirmation prevents this in the vast majority of cases). But for the time being, regular users should be more worried about regular old "you-pay-first" fraud on non-escrowed transactions, and man-in-the-middle attacks where an interlocutor passes messages between two trusted parties looking to do business, then walks away with the cash while they both yell that the other person is scamming them (this attack has been executed in the wild).

tl;dr Merchants and exchanges definitely need to wait for confirmations any time transactions are of significant value and/or in exchange for cashlike goods. Individuals transferring small amounts need to be more worried about other aspects of trust in the exchange, and can protect themselves quite effectively with just a single confirmation.

  • Though nobody has claimed to have lost to the Finney attack, it should not be dismissed as being unlikely to occur in the future. The likely reason we don't hear of it is that there are few merchants that accept on 0/unconfirmed, and even fewer selling goods of enough value for it to be worth it for the attacker to attempt this even. Commented Sep 8, 2011 at 1:21
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    You'll note that I don't dismiss the Finney attack in my answer, and instead emphasise its importance. Commented Sep 8, 2011 at 1:30
  • "Two years ago when the software was written, this single confirm myth was a popular belief."... popular among people with such limited knowledge of the bitcoin technology that they have no business writing software for it
    – RentFree
    Commented Dec 13, 2013 at 18:21

This question has been asked several times in several different places, and nobody has yet come forward with evidence of a double-spend attack. It is, of course, possible that nobody is bothering with such an attack because everyone waits for confirmations anyway.

Your analysis is correct. You can act on fewer confirmations with the same level of reliability if you monitor the network from multiple points -- ideally as close to as many large mining pools as possible. And if someone ever did succeed in causing such an attack, you would have irrefutable proof -- the conflicting transaction.

I wonder if mining pools would be willing to provide a web page that lists the transactions they intend to include in the next block (assuming they mined one just then). If a few of the larger pools did this, that would allow you to be much more certain that there was no conflicting transaction on the network. If the two largest pools have your transactions and none of the pools have a conflicting transaction, you can be nearly certain you are safe even with no confirmations.


On March 11th, 2013 there was an unplanned hard fork and as a result there was at least one double spend attack performed in which a large amount of funds (bitcoins worth $10K USD) were double spent.

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    For those too lazy to click through, or in case the links die, it was not a criminal operation: the user voluntarily returned the funds. Commented Apr 10, 2013 at 0:58

September/October 2013 - GHASH.IO Pool Operators were accused of double-spending against BetCoin Dice:



"I'm saying ghash.io was likely involved in that double-spending. I got a report from a pool's user that there were no blocks (rewards) between 25th and 27th of september. It means that user's hashpower was used for free by pool operators to perform this attack."

The case made is that BetCoin Dice was using a 0-confirm method on spends, and that GHASH.IO hash power was being abused/used to verify/confirm only winning bets (ignoring non-winning bets). There were a significant enough stream of win-only confirmations to suggest 'someone' within the ghash.io pool was all but provably double-spending bitcoins and then using ghash.io's hashing power to get winning confirmations into the blockchain before non-winning transactions could be confirmed by the rest of the network.

CEX.IO obviously denies involvement, but it raises a larger question about how we are to keep watch for fraud like this? Aside from the people being affected, does anyone bother auditing block results (invalid and valid alike?)


The old answer from David Schwartz implies that no successful double-spend, of even an UNCONFIRMED transaction, has ever been seen. That needs to be updated:

There has been at least one significant double-spend -- of a 15-confirmation transaction during the .7/.8 fork.

There are successful double-spends of unconfirmed transactions every day. See http://respends.thinlink.com

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